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Abstract. To safeguard fairness for all parties involved and proper procedure, 
actions within a legal context are heavily constrained. Detailed laws determine 
when actions are permissible and admissible. However, these restrictions do not 
prevent participants from acting. In this paper we present a methodology to sup­
port legal reasoning using institutions—systems that specify the normative be­
haviour of participants—and a corresponding computational model. We show 
how it provides a useful separation between the identiﬁcation of real world ac­
tions, if and how they affect the legal model and how consequences within the 
legal model can be speciﬁed and veriﬁed. Thus, it is possible to deﬁne a context, 
introduce a real-world event and examine how this changes the state of the le­
gal model: hence, the modeller can explore both model adequacy and that of the 
legal framework from which it is derived, as well as offering a machine-usable 
legal ‘oracle’ for software components. We illustrate the use of our framework by 
modelling contract cancellation under Japanese contract law. 
Introduction 
The concept of normative frameworks, or institutions, and organizational modelling is 
gaining acceptance in the multi-agent systems (MAS) as a potential solution to the chal­
lenge of governing open systems. Modelling frameworks typically provide a method for 
the formalization of norms, thus capturing some statement of the designer’s intentions 
for how participants should behave: which actions they are allowed to perform and 
which ones are not permitted. That does not necessarily ensure compliant behaviour: 
violation detection is generally feasible, as long as agents’ actions are somehow ob­
servable, but enforcement is a separate issue, which has many implementations on the 
spectrum between social and legal punishment. 
For the last four years, we have been developing a modelling framework and toolset, 
based on the logic programming language of Answer Set Programming [3], that ad­
dresses the governance of multi-agent systems. The aim is to express the range of ac­
tions, and constraints, on software agents in a machine processable form. The designer 
can (exhaustively) explore the reachable states of the model as a means to validate it 
and in a running system, the model can be used to compare agent behaviour against 
expectations. It may also function as an oracle service for agents to query at run time. 
The preoccupations of just building a system that behaves as desired tends to oc­
clude the precept that agents, the actors, are situated and that situation does not include 
just the physical environment that agents can sense and act upon [12], but should also 
take account of the (multiple) legal contexts in which such systems may be deployed. 
An essential aspect of our modelling framework is its support for the distinction—and 
connection—that the designer can make between real world events and institutional 
events, following the principle of “counts-as” established by Jones and Sergot [11]. 
This “counts-as” relation, effective on events, is different from the count-as relations 
discussed in [6] that operate on facts and are context dependent. Since this institutional 
interpretation of events is a declarative program, it can be a formal representation of 
some fragment of a legal code, thus building a connection between agents and a situat­
ing legal framework. In this paper we use a Japanese contract law as a case study. 
1 Institutions 
Formal Model Our formal model has been described in detail in [1], but to make this 
paper self-contained we provide a brief overview here. 
The premise of our model is that events trigger the creation of institutional facts, 
inspired by Jones and Sergot’ [11] account of institutional power and the notion of 
‘counts-as’, to explain the connection between exogenous events and institutional events— 
this is our generation relation. An event may change the institutional state by initiating 
or terminating ﬂuents—this is our consequence relation. The state consists of brute do­
main facts [9] and institutional facts specifying permission and power, of events and of 
obligations to perform an action. Thus, given an event and an institutional model state, 
represented as a set of (institutional) facts, the next state is determined by the transitive 
closure of the generation and consequence relations. The analogy we make for legal 
reasoning is that the generation relation models actions of individuals in the real world, 
creating institutional events in the pertinent legal context, consequently initiating and 
terminating domain and institutional facts by means of the consequence relation. 
The formal institutional model is necessarily more detailed and precise than the 
sketch above. The essential elements are: (i) events (E), that bring about changes in 
state, and (ii) ﬂuents (F), that characterise the state at a given instant, where a ﬂu­
ent is a term whose presence in the institutional state indicates it is true, and absence 
implies falsity. We distinguish two kinds of events: institutional (Einst), that are the 
events deﬁned by the model and exogenous (Eex), that are outside its scope, but whose 
occurrence triggers institutional events reﬂecting the counts-as principle. We partition 
institutional events into institutional actions (Eact) that denote changes in institutional 
state and violation events (Eviol), that signal the occurrence of violations. Violations 
may be generated explicitly, or through the occurrence of a non-permitted event, or 
from the failure to fulﬁl an obligation. We distinguish two kinds of ﬂuents: institutional 
that denote institutional properties of the state such as permissions P , powers W and 
obligations O, and domain D that correspond to institutional framework speciﬁc prop­
erties. The set of all ﬂuents is denoted as F . 
The evolution of the state of the framework is achieved through the deﬁnition of 
two relations: (i) the generation relation: that speciﬁes how the occurrence of one (ex­
ogenous or institutional) event generates another (institutional) event, subject to the 
empowerment of the actor. Formally, this can be expressed as G : X × E → 2Einst , 
where X denotes a formula over the (institutional) state and E an event, whose conﬂu­
ence results in an institutional event, and (ii) the consequence relation, that speciﬁes the 
initiation and termination of ﬂuents subject to the performance of some action in a state 
matching some expression, or formally C : X × E → 2F × 2F . 
Again, for the sake of context, we summarize the semantics of our framework and 
cite [1] for an in-depth discussion. The semantics is deﬁned over a sequence, called 
a trace, of exogenous events. Starting from the initial state, each exogenous event is 
responsible for a state change, through initiation and termination of ﬂuents, that is 
achieved by a two-step process: (i) the transitive closure of G with respect to a given 
exogenous event determines all the (institutional) events that result from this event, in­
cluding violations of events that where not permitted and violations events of unfulﬁlled 
obligations, while excluding events that are not empowered. (ii) the application of C to 
this set of events, identiﬁes all ﬂuents to initiate and terminate with respect to the current 
state in order to obtain the next state; this also includes the termination of obligations 
that have been fulﬁlled or violated. So for each trace, we can obtain a sequence of states 
that constitutes the model of the institutional framework. 
InstAL While the formal framework has its value, from a designer’s point of view 
it is not very convenient and forces technical/mathematical details to intrude into the 
modelling process. Consequently, we designed a simple domain-speciﬁc language for 
institutional frameworks called InstAL . We give a brief introduction through examples 
of the language features taken from the case study on Japanese contract law which 
features later in this paper: 
–	 institution name declares the name of the institutional framework, such as 
institution legal 
–	 type identiﬁer declares a type, such as type Agent. Type declarations establish a 
disjoint set of mono-morphic types. 
–	 exogenous event event-name(type+) declares a new physical world event and the 
types of its parameters, such as exogenous event sale(Agent, Agent) 
–	 inst event event-name(type+) declares a new legal world event and the types of 
its parameters, such as inst event intSale(Agent, Agent). 
–	 violation event event-name(type+) declares a new violation event, such as 
violation event contractViolationBuyer(Agent) 
–	 fluent ﬂuent-name(type+) declares a new institutional fact—that is, an object that 
can be an element of the institutional state, such as fluent contract(Agent, 
Agent) 
–	 event-name generates legal-world-event+ [if state-condition] adds a new 
pair to the generation relation with domain event (physical or legal) and 
range legal world event, subject to an optional condition on the state. For 
example: sale(Seller, Buyer) generates intSale(Seller, Buyer) if 
hasGood(Seller), hasMoney(Buyer), where the condition is the presence of the 
ﬂuents hasGood and hasMoney with the corresponding Seller and Buyer (these 
variables are uniﬁed) in the institutional state. 
–	 event-name initiates legal-world-ﬂuent+ [state-condition] adds a new pair to 
the consequence (addition) relation, with event (physical or legal) and ﬂuent. Thus, 
sale(Seller, Buyer) initiates contract(Seller, Buyer) adds the corre­
sponding ﬂuent to the institutional state. 
–	 event-name terminates legal-world-ﬂuent+ [condition] adds a new pair to the 
consequence (deletion) relation, with event (physical or legal) and ﬂuent. Thus, 
transfer(Seller) terminates hasGood(Seller) deletes the corresponding 
ﬂuent from the institutional state. 
–	 perm(event) is a special ﬂuent whose presence indicates that the event is permitted, 
such as perm(transfer(Seller)), and is typically the subject of an initiates 
or terminates rule. 
–	 pow(event) is a special ﬂuent whose presence indicates that the event is empowered 
(has an effect), such as pow(transfer(Seller)), and is typically the subject of an 
initiates or terminates rule. 
–	 obl(event, event, event) is a special ﬂuent whose presence indicates the exis­
tence of an obligation, such as obl(transfer(Seller), handOverDeadline, 
contractViolationSeller(Seller)), indicating that the ﬁrst event needs to oc­
cur before the second. If this is not the case, the third event, normally a violation 
event will take place. In either case, the obligation is terminated. Typically the sub­
ject of an initiates rule. 
We realize the above speciﬁcation by translation to a (non-monotonic) logic pro­
gramming language call Answer Set Programming (ASP) [3]. This translation includes 
code to take care of inertia of ﬂuents and removal of satisﬁed or violated obligations. 
Again the full details can be found in [1], including a proof of the soundness and com­
pleteness of the translation. The result of the translation is a computational model that 
can generate sequences of all possible states of the institutional framework (these are 
the answer sets of program), given some initial conditions. The development, execution 
and visualization of institutions is supported by the IDE InstSuite [8]. 
Methodology Our institution terminology refers to exogenous and institutional events. 
From the perspective of a legal domain, the ﬁrst represent the actions of the participants: 
e.g. signing a contract, while institutional events are a mechanism for the legal interpre­
tation of these actions. For example, a signature of a minor is not recognised or stating 
that one cancels a contract does not automatically mean that the contract has indeed 
been cancelled; certain conditions must be fulﬁlled for a contract to be cancelled. Insti­
tutions make explicit this separation of concerns and allow reasoning on both levels. 
In our model, each exogenous event of concern has a corresponding institutional 
event, that functions as a gatekeeper to the legal model. If the actor of an exogenous 
event does not have the necessary credentials or certain conditions are not met, the 
institutional event does not occur and nothing changes within the model, so the exoge­
nous event is of no consequence. The credentials are modelled by assigning institutional 
power to the the gatekeeper events. Without institutional power, these events are not 
triggered. Permission of exogenous events and gatekeeper events is determined by the 
legal rules that are modelled. 
Each institutional event can generate further institutional events to allow for the 
speciﬁcation of special or alternative cases, e.g. buyers and sellers have different obli­
gations when a contract is established. 
Case: 
Contract: 
–	 X had a contract to buy a piece of jewellery from Y for 1 million yen. 
–	 X was supposed to pay 1 million yen on Sep 30 2009 at Y’s residence and 
– Y was supposed to give the jewellery to Y on the same day. 
2007 Sep 30: 
–	 X gave 1 million yen to Y, but Y did not give the jewellery to X, so X demanded to Y to give the 
jewellery J by Oct 14 
2007 Oct 14: 
– Y did not give the jewellery to X 
2007 Oct 15: 
–	 X cancels the contract 
Question: Is the cancellation of the contract by X valid? 
Fig. 1. Contract Cancellation Scenario 
Obligations are used to express when future events have to take place, e.g. the con­
tract requires that the goods are transferred before a certain date. To make the model 
as abstract as possible, dates are not encoded in the model instead we use exogenous 
events that act as deadlines, i.e. the obligation has to satisﬁed before the deadline occurs. 
This deadline can be generated by an agent action as a timekeeper. 
Dedicated violation events can be introduced to indicate not only that an event has 
taken place without permission but also that an obligation was not fulﬁlled or that an 
undesirable event has taken place given the current state of affairs. 
The domain ﬂuents are used to describe the non-institutional state of the world. 
They keep track of what has happened in the system; i.e. a contract was signed, money 
was transferred, relevant details of the participants, etc.. 
2 Modelling Contract Law: A Case Study 
Contract Cancellation under Japanese Law: We take our case study from Japanese 
contract law. 
In our case study we look at contract cancellation. The question we aim to be able 
to answer is “When is it permissible to cancel a contract?”. Although the speciﬁcation 
is more general, the objective is to answer the question in the scenario presented in 
Figure 1 against the Articles presented in Figure 2. 
InstAL Speciﬁcation Contract execution and cancellation consists of various stages: 
(i) ﬁrst a contract has to be established, (ii) then, if all parties adhere to it, the contract is 
executed (iii) a reminder can be sent if one of the parties misses a deadline (iv) if a party 
breaks the contract, the other party can cancel the contract, after which the transactions 
have to be undone. The InstAL speciﬁcation of these ﬁve phases, set-up, execution, 
reminding, cancellation and transaction reversal, can be found in Figures 3-8. 
We discuss these stages in more detail later, but before doing so we need to declare 
the types, events and ﬂuents needed in the speciﬁcation. Their full declaration can be 
found in Figure 3. We name our institutional framework legal (Line 1). Our speciﬁ­
cation has only needs one type (Line 4) to represent the participants. The participant 
actions are represented as exogenous events (Lines 7-13). The contract institutions has 
ﬁve deadlines (dates) by which certain actions have to be performed. They are modelled 
– Article 412 (Time for Performance and Delay in Performance) 
1.	 If any specified due date is assigned to the performance of an obligation, 
the obliger shall be responsible for the delay on and after the time of 
the arrival of such time limit. 
2.	 If any unspecified due date is assigned to the performance of a claim, 
the obliger shall be responsible for the delay on and after the time when 
he/she becomes aware of the arrival of such time limit. 
3.	 If no time limit is assigned to the performance of an obligation, the 
obliger shall be responsible for the delay on and after the time he/she 
receives the request for performance. 
– Article 540 (Exercise of Right to Cancel) 
1.	 If one of the parties has a right to cancel in accordance with the 
provisions of the contract or law, the cancellation shall be effected 
by manifestation of intention to the other party. 
2.	 The manifestation of intention under the preceding paragraph may not be 
revoked. 
– Article 555 (Sale) 
1.	 A sale shall become effective when one of the parties promises to transfer 
a certain real rights to the other party and the other party promises to 
pay the purchase money for it. 
– Article 541 (Right to Cancel for Delayed Performance) 
1.	 In cases where one of the parties does not perform his/her obligations, 
if the other party demands performance of the obligations, specifying a 
reasonable period and no performance is tendered during that period, the 
other party may cancel the contract. 
Fig. 2. Related Civil Law on contract cancellation (translated provided by Japanese Law Translation 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp) 
as exogenous events (Line 15 -19). Each institutional framework has a special event that 
will initialise it: for legal, we name this creation event start (Line 22). As described 
in section 1, for each exogenous events for which the model should account, we deﬁne 
a corresponding institutional event (Lines 25-32). Here, this means all the actions of 
the participants except for the reminder. Setting up the contract, intSale, results in 
two further institutional events, transferReq and paymentReq, whose purpose is to 
differentiate between buyers and sellers (Lines 26-27). The model also distinguishes 
four violation events, different from unpermitted events, to indicate that the buyer or 
the seller has not fulﬁlled their obligation with respect to the contract or its return pol­
icy (Lines 35-38). Apart from keeping track of power and permission for each of the 
events, the model also monitors the contract, the goods and the money involved in the 
transactions. This is done by the domain ﬂuents deﬁned in Lines 41-46. 
The next step is to deﬁne the rules of the institutional framework, starting with set­
ting up the contract (see Fig. 4). The triggering event of this phase is sale. A contract 
between buyer and seller (Line 53) is set up if intSale is empowered and permitted 
and if the seller has the goods and the buyer has the money (Line 53). The genera­
tion of intSale generates transferReq and paymentReq (Line 57) and initiates the 
contract ﬂuent (Line 58). In turn, the two generated events set up the contractual 
obligations for the buyer and seller and give them the necessary power and permission 
to do so (Lines 61–70). The contractual obligations are automatically removed when 
the participants fulﬁl them or when the deadlines expire. 
The next phase details the normal execution of a contract (see Fig. 5). When the 
seller (giveGoods) or the buyer (makePayment) satisﬁes their part of the contract 
(Lines 75–76), the corresponding institutional events change the owner of the money 
or goods and removes the power and permission of the execution events (Lines 78–84). 
If either participant fulﬁls their contractual obligations, irrespective of the deadline, 
1 institution legal; 
2 
3 % Types 
4 type Agent; 
5 
6 % exogeneous events 
7 exogenous event 
8 exogenous event 
9 exogenous event 
10 exogenous event 
11 exogenous event 
12 exogenous event 
13 exogenous event 
14 
15 exogenous event 
16 exogenous event 
17 exogenous event 
18 exogenous event 
19 exogenous event 
20 
21 % creation 
sale(Agent,Agent); % 
giveGoods(Agent); 
makePayment(Agent); 
reminder(Agent); 
cancel(Agent); 
repayBuyer(Agent); 
returnSeller(Agent); 
handOverDeadline; 
paymentDeadline; 
handOverDeadline2; 
paymentDeadline2; 
returnDeadline; 
22 create event start;

23

24 % institutional events

25 inst event intSale(Agent,Agent);

26 inst event transferReq(Agent);

27 inst event paymentReq(Agent);

28 inst event transfer(Agent);

29 inst event payment(Agent);

30 inst event cancellation(Agent);

31 inst event intrepayBuyer(Agent);

32 inst event intreturnSeller(Agent);

33

34 % violation

Seller, Buyer 
% Seller, Buyer 
35 violation event contractViolationBuyer(Agent);

36 violation event contractViolationSeller(Agent);

37 violation event contractReturnViolationBuyer(Agent);

38 violation event contractReturnViolationSeller(Agent);

39

40 % fluents

41 fluent contract(Agent,Agent); % Seller, Buyer

42 fluent cancelledContract(Agent,Agent); % Seller, Buyer

43 fluent hasGood(Agent);

44 fluent hasMoney(Agent);

45 fluent paid;

46 fluent transferred;

Fig. 3. Declaration of types and events in the model 
it should be impossible for the other party to cancel the contract (Lines 87–90). The 
occurrence of the deadlines handOverDeadline and PaymentDeadline permits the 
occurrence of reminders and terminates the permission for the deadline to occur again 
(Lines 92–96). 
The reminder phase is speciﬁed in Fig. 6. From the previous phase we know that 
this phase can only occur without causing violation (from the reminder perspective) 
when the deadline for the contractual obligation has lapsed for one of the participants. 
The cancellation phase speciﬁcation is given in Fig. 7. Whenever one of the par­
ticipants tries to cancel a contract (cancel) it is the status of the empowerment of the 
institutional event cancellation that determines whether the contract cancellation is 
valid or not (Line 116). The state of the contract may be changed from contract to 
cancelled (Lines 117–119). Once the contract is cancelled power and permission to 
cancel the contract is no longer required (Line 121). The power and permission to cancel 
48 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

49 % Establish Contract

50 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

51 % the sale proceeds if sale is empowered and both participants have

52 % the correct assests

53 sale(Seller,Buyer) generates intSale(Seller,Buyer) if hasGood(Seller),

54 hasMoney(Buyer);

55

56 % sale split between buyer and seller responsibilities

57 intSale(Seller,Buyer) generates transferReq(Seller), paymentReq(Buyer);

58 intsale(Seller,Buyer) initiates contract(Seller,Buyer);

59

60 % obligations for buyer and seller specified

61 transferReq(Seller) initiates obl(transfer(Seller),handOverDeadline,

62 contractViolationSeller(Seller));

63 paymentReq(Buyer) initiates obl(payment(Buyer),paymentDeadline,;

64 contractViolationBuyer(Buyer));

65

66 % appropriate permission and power given

67 transferReq(Seller) initiates pow(transfer(Seller)),perm(transfer(Seller)),

68 perm(handOverDeadline);

69 paymentReq(Buyer) initiates pow(payment(Buyer)),perm(payment(Buyer)),

70 perm(paymentDeadline);

Fig. 4. Setting up a contract in InstAL 
72 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

73 % Executing Contract

74 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

75 giveGoods(Seller) generates transfer(Seller) if hasGood(Seller);

76 makePayment(Buyer) generates payment(Buyer) if hasMoney(Buyer);

77

78 transfer(Seller) initiates transferred, hasGood(Buyer)

79 if contract(Seller,Buyer);

80 transfer(Seller) terminates hasGood(Seller);

81 payment(Buyer) initiates paid, hasMoney(Seller) if contract(Seller,Buyer);

82 payment(Buyer) terminates hasMoney(Buyer);

83 transfer(Seller) terminates pow(transfer(Seller)),perm(transfer(Seller));

84 payment(Buyer) terminates pow(payment(Buyer)),perm(payment(Buyer));

85

86 % transfer or payment retracts permission to cancel for opposite party

87 transfer(Seller) terminates pow(cancellation(Byer)),perm(cancellation(Buyer)),

88 perm(cancel(Buyer)) if contract(Seller,Buyer);

89 payment(Buyer) terminates pow(cancellation(Seller)),perm(cancellation(Seller)),

90 perm(cancel(Seller)) if contract(Seller,Buyer);

91

92 handOverDeadline initiates perm(reminder(Buyer));

93 paymentDeadline initiates perm(reminder(Seller));

94

95 handOverDeadline terminates perm(handOverDeadline);

96 paymentDeadline terminates perm(paymentDeadline);

Fig. 5. Executing a contract in InstAL 
98 %----------------------------------------------------------------­
99 % Reminder 
100 %----------------------------------------------------------------­
101 % give the agents a second change 
102 reminder(Seller) initiates obl(transfer(Seller),handOverDeadline2, 
103 contractViolationSeller(Seller)), 
104 perm(handOverDeadline2) if not transferred; 
105 
106 reminder(Buyer) initiates obl(payment(Buyer),paymentDeadline2, 
107 contractViolationBuyer(Buyer)), 
108 perm(paymentDeadline2) if not paid; 
Fig. 6. Reminders in the model 
110 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

111 % Cancelling the contract

112 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

113 % Cancellation procudure: cancellation only empowered when violation

114 % occured and only given to grieved agent

115

116 cancel(Agent) generates cancellation(Agent);

117 cancellation(Agent) terminates contract(Seller,Buyer);

118 cancellation(Agent) initiates cancelledContract(Seller,Buyer)

119 if contract(Seller,Buyer);

120

121 cancellation(Agent1) terminates pow(cancellation(Agent)),

122 perm(cancellation(Agent)), perm(cancel(Agent));

123

124 % power and permission to cancel is given to appropriate agent

125 contractViolationSeller(Seller) initiates pow(cancellation(Agent)),

126 perm(cancellation(Agent)),

127 perm(cancel(Agent))

128 if contract(Seller,Agent), paid;

129 contractViolationBuyer(Buyer) initiates pow(cancellation(Agent)),

130 perm(cancellation(Agent)),

131 perm(cancel(Agent))

132 if contract(Agent,Buyer), transferred;

Fig. 7. Cancelling the contract in InstAL 
134 %-----------------------------------------------------------------­

135 % Return Policy

136 %----------------------------------------------------------------­

137 % if goods or money has changes owner they need to be returned when the

138 % contract is cancelled

139 cancellation(Agent) initiates perm(repayBuyer(Seller)),

140 pow(intrepayBuyer(Seller)),

141 perm(intrepayBuyer(Seller)),

142 obl(repayBuyer(Seller),returnDeadline,

143 contractReturnViolationSeller(Seller))

144 if contract(Seller,Buyer), hasMoney(Seller);

145 cancellation(Agent) initiates perm(returnSeller(Buyer)),

146 pow(intreturnSeller(Buyer)),

147 perm(intreturnSeller(Buyer)),

148 obl(returnSeller(Buyer), returnDeadline,

149 contractReturnViolationBuyer(Buyer))

150 if contract(Seller,Buyer), hasGood(Buyer);

151

152 repayBuyer(Seller) generates intrepayBuyer(Seller);

153 intrepayBuyer(Seller) initiates hasMoney(Buyer)

154 if cancelledContract(Seller,Buyer);

155 intrepayBuyer(Seller) terminates hasMoney(Seller)

156 if cancelledContract(Seller,Buyer);

157

158 returnSeller(Buyer) generates intreturnSeller(Buyer);

159 intreturnSeller(Buyer) initiates hasGood(Seller)

160 if cancelledContract(Seller,Buyer);

161 intreturnSeller(Buyer) terminates hasGood(Buyer)

162 if cancelledContract(Seller,Buyer);

Fig. 8. Modelling the return policy in InstAL 
164 %--------------------------------------------------------­
165 % Initial state 
166 %--------------------------------------------------------­
167 initially pow(transferReq(seller)), pow(paymentReq(buyer)), 
168 perm(transferReq(seller)), perm(paymentReq(buyer)), 
169 perm(sale(seller,buyer)),perm(makePayment(buyer)), 
170 perm(giveGoods(seller)),hasGood(seller), hasMoney(buyer), 
171 pow(intSale(seller,buyer)), perm(intSale(seller,buyer)); 
Fig. 9. The initial state 
1 observed(start,i00). 6 observed(reminder(seller),i05). 
2 observed(sale(seller,buyer),i01). 7 observed(handOverDeadline2,i06). 
3 observed(makePayment(buyer),i02). 8 observed(cancel(buyer),i07). 
4 observed(paymentDeadline,i03). 9 observed(repayBuyer(seller),i08). 
5 observed(handOverDeadline,i04). 
Fig. 10. The complete trace of our contract example 
the contract is given to a party in the contract when the other party fails to satisfy their 
part of the contract. In our model, failure is represented by a contractViolation 
event (Lines 125–132). 
The ﬁnal phase, the return policy, appears in Fig. 8. When a contract is cancelled, 
transferred goods and money must be returned to the original owner. Therefore, the 
occurrence of cancellation generates the permission and the obligation for the par­
ticipants to return what they have received (Lines 139–150). When the buyer and seller 
return/repay the goods/money, ownership is adjusted accordingly (Lines 152–162). 
With the ﬁve phases now speciﬁed, we just need the initial state to complete the 
model. In this case, this is the power and permission for the events that make up the 
ﬁrst phase of the model (see Fig. 9). 
Running the Model: Before we can run the model, we must declare the participating 
agents, by means of: Agent: buyer seller. The resulting ASP program can be used in a 
variety of ways. Without additional constraints, the model can compute all the possible 
ways exogenous events can take place and their consequences. From a more practical 
point of view, the model can be used to answer speciﬁc questions about the validity 
of an action/event given a sequence of events. While in most cases a complete set of 
events would be given, e.g. representing a speciﬁc case, the model is capable of reason­
ing about an incomplete sequence of events. Another use of the model is to verify the 
current state of affairs, e.g. is the contract still in place or has it been cancelled. Also, 
one can query the model for legal loopholes by asking if it is possible for a certain 
situation to occur. 
While in litigation one often only takes the current status of rights and obligation 
between parties into account, there are situations, from example in tort or when reason­
ing about a prescription, where past and future statuses do matter. The model presented 
in paper, due the tracking the various states and partial sequences of events, allows for 
reasoning not only in the present but past and future as well. 
ASP facts of the form observed(event,time) are added to represent complete 
or partial traces. A complete trace matching the scenario in Fig 1 displayed in Fig 10. It 
starts with the creation event followed by setting up the contract. After payment and the 
expiry of deadlines the seller (y) is reminded about his/her obligations. After that dead­
line expires the buyer cancels the contract. The trace ﬁnishes with seller repaying the 
buyer. The textual output from running the model is rather hard for humans to process. 
To make examining the model more user friendly InstSuite provides trace diagrams that 
graphically represent the events and state changes over time. Figures 11 and 12 provide 
a visualization of the complete trace. States are denoted by circles and transition events 
are shown above the lines connecting states, with exogenous events in bold. For each 
state, all the ﬂuents that are true in that state are listed and initiated ﬂuents are in bold. 
As we can see from the trace, the only violation that occurred was contractViola­
tionSeller(seller). No viol(cancel(buyer)) occurred indicating that it was 
legal for buyer to cancel the contract. 
3 Summary, Related and Future Work 
In this paper we have demonstrated that is possible to use the concept institutional 
framework for the representation of and reasoning about legal state. We have shown 
that the same tools can be usefully employed to make machine processable equivalents 
of legislation available for the governance of and reference by software components. 
The formal representation of legal frameworks by normative systems has been a 
subject of research for several decades: a comprehensive discussion appears in [10]. 
Contracts, speciﬁcally, have received much attention using different formalisms, al­
though defeasible logic [4, 5] is considered particularly appropriate, along with various 
executable representations, such as RuleML in [4]. 
Herrestad in [7] argues that Sergot’s formalisation of the library regulations is con­
fronted with the Christholm paradox and that therefore logic programming formalism 
i00 i01 i02 i03 i04 i05 i06 i07 i08 i09
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(buyer)
live(legal)
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(intSale(seller,buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(sale(seller,buyer))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller,buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller,buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(buyer)
live(legal)
obl(payment(buyer),
paymentDeadline,
contractV iolationBuyer(buyer))
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(payment(buyer))
perm(paymentDeadline)
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)payment(buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentDeadline)
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
perm(cancel(buyer))
perm(cancellation(buyer))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)cancellation(buyer)
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline2,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(cancel(buyer))
perm(cancellation(buyer))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)cancellation(buyer)
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
perm(cancel(buyer))
perm(cancellation(buyer))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)cancellation(buyer)
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
cancelledContract(seller,buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(repayBuyer(seller),
returnDeadline,
contractReturnV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(intrepayBuyer(seller))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(repayBuyer(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)intrepayBuyer(seller)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
cancelledContract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(buyer)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(intrepayBuyer(seller))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(repayBuyer(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)intrepayBuyer(seller)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
start
start
sale(seller,buyer)
intSale(seller, buyer)
paymentReq(buyer)
sale(seller, buyer)
transferReq(seller)
makePayment(buyer)
makePayment(buyer)
payment(buyer)
paymentDeadline
paymentDeadline
handOverDeadline
contractV iolationSeller(seller)
handOverDeadline
reminder(seller)
reminder(seller)
handOverDeadline2
contractV iolationSeller(seller)
handOverDeadline2
cancel(buyer)
cancel(buyer)
cancellation(buyer)
repayBuyer(seller)
intrepayBuyer(seller)
repayBuyer(seller)
Fig. 11. The ﬁrst 5 time instances of the example trace 
i00 i01 i02 i03 i04 i05 i06 i07 i08 i09
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(buyer)
live(legal)
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(intSale(seller,buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(sale(seller,buyer))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller,buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller,buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(buyer)
live(legal)
obl(payment(buyer),
paymentDeadline,
contractV iolationBuyer(buyer))
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(payment(buyer))
perm(paymentDeadline)
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)payment(buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentDeadline)
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
perm(cancel(buyer))
perm(cancellation(buyer))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)cancellation(buyer)
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(transfer(seller),
handOverDeadline2,
contractV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(cancel(buyer))
perm(cancellation(buyer))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)cancellation(buyer)
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
contract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
perm(cancel(buyer))
perm(cancellation(buyer))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)cancellation(buyer)
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
cancelledContract(seller,buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
obl(repayBuyer(seller),
returnDeadline,
contractReturnV iolationSeller(seller))
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(intrepayBuyer(seller))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(repayBuyer(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)intrepayBuyer(seller)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
cancelledContract(seller, buyer)
hasGood(seller)
hasMoney(buyer)
hasMoney(seller)
live(legal)
perm(giveGoods(seller))
perm(handOverDeadline2)
perm(intSale(seller, buyer))
perm(intrepayBuyer(seller))
perm(makePayment(buyer))
perm(paymentReq(buyer))
perm(reminder(buyer))
perm(reminder(seller))
perm(repayBuyer(seller))
perm(sale(seller, buyer))
perm(transfer(seller))
perm(transferReq(seller))
pow(legal)intSale(seller, buyer)
pow(legal)intrepayBuyer(seller)
pow(legal)paymentReq(buyer)
pow(legal)transfer(seller)
pow(legal)transferReq(seller)
start
start
sale(seller,buyer)
intSale(seller, buyer)
paymentReq(buyer)
sale(seller, buyer)
transferReq(seller)
makePayment(buyer)
makePayment(buyer)
payment(buyer)
paymentDeadline
paymentDeadline
handOverDeadline
contractV iolationSeller(seller)
handOverDeadline
reminder(seller)
reminder(seller)
handOverDeadline2
contractV iolationSeller(seller)
handOverDeadline2
cancel(buyer)
cancel(buyer)
cancellation(buyer)
repayBuyer(seller)
intrepayBuyer(seller)
repayBuyer(seller)
Fig. 12. The last 5 time instances of the example trace 
are ill-suited for modelling this kind of knowledge. Herrestad claim is based the as­
sumption that implication can be rewritten as a disjunction. In answer set programming, 
this is not the case as it uses negation as failure which if semantics differs from classi­
cal negation (see [2] for more information). Furthermore, with our approach there is no 
need to express that no disciplinary action is taken when books are returned on time. 
This is supported implicitly. 
At this stage, we have completed an off-line speciﬁcation that can be used to answer 
the question posed in section 2. While this is “just another model”, we observe that con­
ventionally in litigation, only the current status of rights and obligations between parties 
is usually considered. However, a potential beneﬁt of the approach taken is the capacity 
to reason about not only the current status, but also the past (postdiction) and future 
status (prediction) [8]. Furthermore, the tools demonstrated (and under development— 
see below) may offer a way to bridge the practical gap between legal modelling and 
software agents. 
Future work is proceeding on three fronts: (i) contract recision: this extends the 
case described here (ii) on-line reasoning: we are developing the means for agents to 
reason about institutional facts in a different domain, but using the same institutional 
model (iii) model reﬁnement: as models become more complicated, they are harder to 
write and to debug: consequently, we are using an inductive logic programming appli­
cation that given test cases and desired outcomes suggests new, and revises old, rules. 
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